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The information that is used create a numerical response is typically diffuse,
and cannot be described by a distribution-. A criterion to describe the informa-
tion is its range of reasonable alternatives, corresponding to the worst case - best
case analysis of practitioners in decision situations where distributions are missing.
Empirical data show, that numerical responses in such situation~ follow a rule that
-givesconditions for the exactness of the response. The rule says that the exactness
is selected such that there are"between 3 and 5 alternatives on this or a cruder level
of exactness in the range of reasonable alternatives. This rule permits -to predict
the exactriess of responses, but also permits to deduce on the exactness of informa-
tion. Once known, it is a powerful tool to inform about information and motives of
subjects from thei~ riumerical responses. - The paper introduces the rule, and gives
some empirical examples that support the theory. These examples- concern retail
price setting of firms, subjects' estimates of numbers of inhabitants of towns, apd a
bearing experiment_in which different degrees of diffuseness are simulated.Contents
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o Notations
The prominent numbers are {a * 10i : a E {I, 2,5},i integer}. The spontaneous numbers
are {a * 10i : a E {I, 1.5,2,3,5, 7,},i integer}. A presentation of a number is its presenta-
tion as a sum of prominent numbers, where'eaeh prominent number oeeurs at most onee,
and all eoeffieients are either +1, -1, or O.The exaetness of a presentation is the smallest
prominent number with eoeffieientunequalzero. The exaetnessof a number x =j:. 0 is the
erudest exaetness over all presentations of the number. The relative exaetness of a number
x =j:. 0 is its exaetness devided by lxi. The exaetness of 0 isoo, its relative exaetness is 1.
A number has level of [relative] exaetness, r, if its [relative] exaetness is eruder or equal
to r. A set of data has [relative] exaetness r, if r is the erudest prominent number such
that at least 75% of the data have this [relative] exaetness. - Ascale S( r, a) is"the set of
o and all numbers numbers with (1) relative exaetness ::::r, and (2) exactness ::::a. Two
numbers x, y in S(r, a) are identified when their relative differenee (Iy - xl)jmax(lxl, Iyl)
is smaller than r. - Examples: The presentation of a number need not be unique, for
instanee17= 10+ 5+ 2= 20- 2 - 1. The exactness of 17 is 2. The exaetness of 18 is 2,
too. 17 and 18 are identified in S(5%, 1).
1 Exactness Selection Rule
The level of exaetness of a numerieal response depends on the exaetness of the stimulus.
A erude but - as it seems' - behaviorally meaningful information to eharaeterize the
exaetness of a signal is the. 'range of reasonable alternatives', i. e. the range between the
lowest and highest 'reasonable r~sponse'.
Exactness Selection Rule: The relative and absolute exaetness r, a of a
numerieal response are selected such that there are at least 3, and at most 5
steps of the scale S( r, a) in the range of reasonable alternatives.
2In empirical and experimental situations, wher:edistributions could be measured, the
exactness selection rule could be confirmed under the assumption that the range of rea-
sonable alternatives is the range between the end points of the 10% tales on both sides. I.
e. the range of reasonable alternatives carries at least 80% of the mass of the distribution.
(See Sections 3.2-3.4 below.)
The rule does not give a unique prescription, since two parameters r, aare adjusted to
one variable 'extension of range of reasonable alternatives'. This problem disappears for
variables which are sufficiently far awy from the zero point, as most measurements of
length, height, strength, or decimal measurement of time. In these cases it is reasonable
to set a := 0, so that only r has to be determined. In the other cases one needs at least
two decisions to determine rand s (How this can be done for arbitrary prospects is shown
in part V of the Foundation.
As an instrument ofdata-analysis the exactness selection rule can also be used to conclude
from the exactness of a response (or a set of responses) on the corre~ponding range of
reasonable alternatives.
The criterion 'range of reasonable alternatives', given as the range between 'worst case'
and 'best case', seems to fit tothe aspiration structure of decision processing of individuals
and groups.l
The exactness selection rule as introduced above refers to variables which are perceived
in a logarithmic way. However, there seem to be also situations where differences of
numbers are perceived linearly. (It seems, for instance, that payoffs in characteristic
function games can have this character.) In such a situation, there is only one exactness,
a, which describes the steps of perception. The Scale is S( a) := {itimes a : iinteger}, and
the exactness selection rule modifies to: '
Linear Version ofthe Exactness Selection Rule: The absolute exactness
a of a numerical response is selected such that there are at least 3 and at most
5 steps of the scale S(a) in the range of reasonable alternatives.
(Note that specificly for a = 20 the scale S( a) has the steps ..., 0, 20=30, 50, 70=80,
100, 120=130, etc., where steps as '70=80' may be denoted as '70', '80' or '75'.)
Remark: For us it is an open problem, if there are really situations where subjects feel
genuinely linearly. Our impression is rather, that by setting a~chor points (see Part V),
subject can create linear pieces with givenfinenessaround arbitrary numbers. An interest-
ing point is that these linear pieces-as for instance the linear piece of the scale S(26%,10)
of spontaneous numbers, namely -30, -20, -10, 0, +10, +20, +30, typically have a length
of at least 5 elements, so that the exactness selection rule selects a completely linear piece
around the anthor point. Anyway, the ranges between prominent numbers seem to be
typically subdivided in a linear way, as for instance 10, 12=13, 15, 17=18, 20; (as part of
1I remember the report ~f a dealer on financial markets whose group uses worst case - best case
anaiysis as a key instrument of their decisions.
3.
8(.11,0)), or 10, 11, 12, ..., 19, 20 (as part of 8(.05,0).
The exactness selection rule could be verified by several experiments and sets of empirical
data, which are presented in the following.
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Figure 2.1: Range of Reasonable Alter.natives versus Level of Exactness20f Retail Pric-
ing for Branded and Unbranded Articles of the Food 8ector
Empirical Data: Retail prices of 27 branded and 3 nonbranded articles of the food-
sectoI' have been picked up in 35 different shops (size between 200 and 3000 m2). For
every' article the the range of reasonable alternatives was defined by the cuts of the 10%
tales of the distribution of observed prices of this article. - The. exactness of the set of
pr.icesof every article was obtained by a weighted median analysis.3
2In the figure 'level of exactness' is denoted as 'prominence'.
3Assume a single peaked distribution f : [0,100]-? R ismeasured with a tool which can only perceive
integer vahies. Assume the perception p : R -? Z always selects therespectivenearest integer value. -:-
Let-the resultof an empirical investigation be given as frequencies Fon Z. Let M the traditional median
4Prediction: Assuming equal distances between any two numbers selected by the ex-
actness selection rule, the prediction is that the length of the range of reasonable alter-
natives should be at least 2 times as large as the distance ~ of any two prices (case:
l =PI - P2 - P3 = u, where l,u are lower and upper boundary of the range of reasonable
alternatives, PI, ... are the price steps within the range), and at most 5 times as large
(case: l - PI - P2 - P3 - P4 - ps - '!Lwhen land u are between integer steps, assuming
that land u are at half steps).
Result: The obtained data are presented in Figure 2.1. For all branded articles the length
of the range of reasonable alternatives was between 2 and 5 times as large as the amount
of the exactness. Only nonbranded articles (as sliced bread, or apples) did not meet this
condition. It may be suggested that for nonbranded articles as apples one it.em combines
different qualities, so that a wider distribution of prices is reasonable. The result strongly
confirmes the exactness selection rule.
3 Exactness ofResponses Concerning the N umber
of Inhabitants of a Town
Experiment: In part 1 of the questionnaire 19 subjects were asked for the number of
inhabitants of 7 towns. - In part 2 the subjects were asked to describe their individual
distributions concerning the probabilities of different numbers of inhabitants by the fol-
lowing instruction:
"Consider a town, for instance NewYork. May be that you have some idea of the number
of inhabitants, and may be that.you evaluate certain numbers of inhabitants as more likely
than others. . To describe the corresponding distribution, select different numbers Xi of
inhabitants as possible estimates (for New York you may for instance select the Xi in steps
of 1 Million, 500.000, .or in finer steps), and give for each number Xi a response ri that
characterizes the intensity of your feeling that Xi is the right number of inhabitants. (For
someof you it maybe helpfulto create the responseas the subjective probability that -
among the selected numbers - Xi is nearest to the true value.) The sum of the responses
should add up to about 100, but do not worry, if it does not: we rather prefer to get your
spontaneous responses than the correct sumo To compare the individual responses we will
anyway normalize the sums of responses to 100 (by multiplication with a factor)."
Predictions: For everysubject and every town the following data were considered:
1. exactness ~ of the response (number of inhabitants),
2. exactness ~' of the set of selected numbers Xi of inhabitants,
of F ,on Z, F(~ M) the sum of frequencies of values at or below M, and F F the total frequency.
Then the weighted median is defined as M +(FF/2-F(~ M))/(F(M)/2+F(N)/2),where N = M-l
if F( < M) > F(> M), N = M + 1 otherwise. - (The concept interpolates between the integer values






3. the width ß of the 80%-interval of reasonable alternatives,
. .
4. the number n of self-selected numbers Xiwithin the 80%-interval of rea-
sonable alternatives.
The relative exactnessseleetionrule predicts: ß/ß :::;5, ß'/ß :::;5 (or :::; 6), and n :::;5
(or ::; 6) (where the last two eonditions are nearly equivalent, sinee the subjeets usually
subd:vided into intervals of equallength). - Coneerning the erudeness of response eom-
pared to the erudeness of the seale it may be expeeted that the response should not be
more than one step finer than that of the seale.
Results: A first result was that the given response .wasin most eases different from the
maximum of the given distribution, there were several eases in whieh the response was
. not even inside the area of the 80% most reasonable alternatives. This suggests th~Ü there
is no fixed distribution whieh ean be reealled from the memory, but that the distribution.
was eonstructed on request, sometimes even from information different from that used for
the first decision.
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Figure 3.1: Graphical Representation of the Responses of a Subject for a Town
(Example)
Table 3.2 shows the frequeneies of different numbers oE.alternatives in the self-ereated
seale. Compared to the predietion there are 13 of 133 eases, where the seale is too erude,
6and 2 (or at most 8) of 133cases, where the scale is too fine. This is significantly different
from chance on the 2% level (binomial test, two-sided).
Table 3.2: Frequencies of Numbers of Selected Alternatives in the Range
of Reasonable Alternatives ( Ä)
# selectedalternativE!s in range 2 3 4 5 6 7 > 7 all
cases (1 caseper personand town) 13 47 38 27 6 2 0 133
Table 3.3 shows that most responses that are not very crude and hit a prominent num-
ber are either equally fine or just one step cruder than the self-selected scales. we have
13=9+4 of 133deviations from the prediction. This is significantly different from chance
on the 1% level (binomial test, one-sided).
Table 3.3: Exactness of Response Compared to Exactness of
response is a prominent number
















Experiment: A scale (from 100 to 300) was given on top of a screen by a horizontal
line on which multiples of ten were marked by small vertical marks. The corresponding
values (100, 110, 120, ..., 300) were displayed right above the marks. This scale was
fixed throughout the experiment. In a given distance from the scale there was another
horizontalline with only one mark. The distance of the horizontalline from the scale was
modified in 5 steps. For every distance the position of the mark was varied. 22 subjects
had the task to identify the position of the mark on the scale by bearing vertically up-
ward, and to answer which point on the scale they obtained. .They were asked to "give
that response with which they were most content" . The distances of the horizontalline
from the scale were 320, 160, 80, 40, ;20pixels. The position of the mark was varied in
a way that the last digit of the number had each of the values 0, 1, 2, ..., 9 with equal
frequency, moreover none of the values appeared a second time before all other values
had appeared. The first two digits of the position of the mark (for instance the 13 of a
position 137) were selected in a way that the position jumped for essential distances from
one question to the next. - The question of the experiment was, how the frequencies of
the last digits of the responses depended on the distance of the mark from the scale. A
priori, every last digit had the same chance, the last digit of ihe position of the mark had
the numbers 0, 1, 2,..., 9 all with the same frequencies.
7Prediction: The bearing process creates an unprecise image of the given signal, which
becomes increasingly unprecise with increasing distance. Accordingly, the exactness of
response should become finer when the distance is reduced. - Since the nonrectangu-
lar part of the bearing followsthe principle of similar triangles, the range of reasonable
alternatives is for every single response proportional to the distance of the mark from
the 5~ale. Accordingly, the absolute exactness' of the responses should increase inversely
proportional with the distance. In particular, the responses should be multiples of ten Jor
sufliciently large distance, and be near to identity when the distance is low (notice that
even then when the mark is on the scale there remains a judgement to decide at which
position the mark is, since only multiples of ten are precisely given by the scale).
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Figure 4.1: Screen 'of the Bearin~ Experiment
Concerning the order, in which numbers should appear with decreas.ingdistance, the first
numt.ers should be the multiples of ten (ending with 0), at smaller distances, numbers
endhig with 5 should. appea;r. At even smaller distances, in addition 2 and 8 should be
answered as.last digits (since they have exactness 2; 2 and 8 are more easily constructed
compared to 3 and 7; since the given scale has marks at 10 = 0, so ,that 2 = 0 + 2 and
8= 10- 2 can be identified easier than 7=5+ 2 and 3=5- 2, sincethes'- tumbersneed
. the additional construction of the 5 which is not marked on the scale' fhereafter the ,
respective most prominent numbers in the respective ranges, namely 1,9 and 3,7 should
appear, and finally 4 and 6. - The distances at which the respective numbers appear,
should be related to the extension of the 80%-interval, which should be a linear function of
the distance. The relation should accord to the prediction of the Exactness Selection Rule.
8r
Results: Figure 4.3 shows the extensions of the 80%-intervals (respective medians over
all subjects) as a function of the distance of the markfrom the scale (in pixels). The
corresponding length's at different distances, and the respective predictions for the exact-
nesses are given in Table 4.2. The observed exactnesses hit these predictions in all cases.
- Figure 4.4 shows the.frequencies of the last digits of the selected responses. These fre-
quencies show a general pattern, as predicted by the theory, but a detailed analysis shows,
that the subjects do not always follow the prediction'. There are subjects who select 9
more easily than 8,.or 6 more easily than 7. It seems that some subjects also show other
motives and preferences for,numbers than those induced by the perception according to
the theory of prominence. At distance 0 the ,numbers 0, 1, 2, ..., 9 were responded as
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Figure 4.3: Extension of the 80%-Interval as a Function of the Distance
9
Table 4.2: Predictions of the Bearing Experiment
distance predicted extension of predicted observed
(pixels) responses (last digits) 80y'-interval exactness exactness
I I
o 0 1 2 3 456 7 8 9 0 2 1 1
20 0 1 2 3 456 7 8 9 0 2 1 1
40 0 1 2 3 5 7 8 9 0 3 1 1
80 0 2
. 5 8 0 4 2 2
160 0 2 5 8 0 7 2 2
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Figure 4.4: Frequencies of Selected Numbers for Different Distances of the Mark from
the Scale
Remark: Not only the described experiment was performed, but also a modifie"dex-
periment performed with the same subjects), in which the marks of the scale were at
the multiples of 5 instead of the multiples of ten. Under this condition, the sequence of
appearance of numbers with decreasing distance between mark and scale changed: First
10appeared numbers that ended with 5, then 0, thereafter 3, 7, then 2, 8, 4, 6 and at last
1, 9 appeared as responses. (For details see VOGT+ALBERS 1992.)
The result confirms the procedure described in Part III, Section 1.2.
5 Comments Concerninga Micro-Justification ofthe
Exactness Selection Rule
An interesting quest ion is, why people decide according to the exactness selection rule.
Our suggestions go into the following directions:
1. Assurne the intensity of a numerical one-dimensional stimulus is given by anormal
distribution. Assurne that adecision maker can observe the distribution with a
coarseness or graneness of her choice, for a given coarseness she selects a scale of
possible equidistant responses. Assurne that for a given scale there is an (automati-
cally and unconsciously working) mechanism that assigns to every number Xi of the
scale that part of the mass of the distribution which belongs to possible real-valued
responses that .are nearer to Xi than to the neighbours of Xi. on the scale.- Let
X(i-l)' Xi",X(i+1)be 3 neighboured numbers of the scale. For 'sufficiently normal' dis-
tributions, each of the 3 alternatives X(i-l)' Xi, X(i+1)is 'quite near' to the maximum,
if each of the 3 numbers carries at least (about) 20% of the mass of the distribu-
tion. ('Quite near' is meant with respect to the distribution, not with respect to the
scale. For instance, for a normal distribution the criterion ensures that the distance
of each of the 3 numbers from the maximum is less than .. 0'.) For several reasons,
for instance that distributions need not be symmetric, it may be reasonable not
always to select the middle response Xi, and instead leave the final decision, which
of the 3 alternatives to select, to other criteria. .
2. A crucial.bottle-neck of decisio~processes is the short-term memory. This addresses
the fact that without of further identification and individualisation of the alterna-
tives a brain can distinguish only up to 5 (at most 7) alternatives. (Example: The
experimenter gives arbitrary integers between 10 and 100 one after the other. The
subject has to repeat the whole sequence after every new number. Usually the first
mistake occurs right after the fifth number. - Explanation: one place of some type
of short term memory carries the information of one of these numbers. As soon as
the number of spaces used is latger than 5, the restriction of the short term memory
applies.4 - Assuming that the subconscious decision process selecting the numerical
respo:pseuses thc short term memory (and needs certain information of all alterna-
tives to be present at the same time, so that the formation of chunks cannot help),
then it seems reasonable that - by restriction of the exactness of the analysis - the
4Note that experienced subjects can build 'chunks', i. e. combine several individual pieces of informa-
tion to one complex, which helps to memorize longer sequences. But chunks cannot be used as individual
pieces of information, they have to be "unpacked", when their information has to be used. Accordingly
the aggregation to chunks cannot be used in the type of decision processing considered here.)
11number of reasonable alternatives is reduced to not more than 5. A careful decision
maker will (unconsciously) select the degree of exactness as fine as possible under
this constraint.
By our empirical data we can presently not decide, which of the two principles "finest
exactness, but not more than 5 reasonable alternatives", or "crudest scale, but at least 3
reasonable alternatives that carry at least 20% of the mass of the distribution" describes
subjects' behavior more adequately.
In this context it may be remarked that the graneness of response is not only given by
the task, but also by the way of presention: if, for instance, the bearing experiment is
performed with two persohs doing their individual experiments in the same room, the
exactness of the responses is slightly, but significantly finer than if the subjects perform
their tasks at different times. Moreover, the task seems not"to be independent from the
way, how it is presented: we had the impression that the instruction "give that answer
with which you are most content" fits best to the idea of individual decision processing.
Less precise descriptions of the task seem to generate in some subjects the effort to hit
the correct number. Accordingly, we preferred in other experiments such questions which
had no correct answers.
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